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VOLATILE WINDFALLS: EFFECTS OF TAX CUTS AND JOBS
ACT FOR S-CORP SHAREHOLDERS WARRANT STRONG
ARM POWER LIMITATION IN BANKRUPTCY
ABSTRACT
For years, a nuanced judicial inconsistency at the intersection of the U.S.
Internal Revenue and Bankruptcy Codes has percolated in bankruptcy and
appellate courts, generating a judicial split and erratic outcomes for a small few
of the approximately 4 million S corporations in the United States. The split
concerns whether S corporation shareholder termination rights granted under
§ 1362 of the Tax Code constitute avoidable fraudulent transfers under § 548 of
the Bankruptcy Code.
Some courts, including those in In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re
Bakersfield Westar, Inc., have historically permitted bankruptcy trustees to
unilaterally shift the capital gains liabilities stemming from asset liquidation
sales of insolvent S corporations to third parties—the business’s shareholders—
who are not parties to the bankruptcy proceeding, characterizing the
terminations as ‘fraudulent conveyances.’ Recently, however, two courts,
including the Third Circuit in In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and a Fourth
Circuit Bankruptcy Court in In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc. have restricted
the liquidating trustee’s nearly unlimited strong arm power to avoid S election
terminations, creating inconsistent treatment in federal bankruptcy courts.
This Comment begins with a background discussion of the relevant sections
of the two federal codes involved in the judicial uncertainty at issue. Second,
this Comment considers potential implications of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on
S corporation shareholders, which is likely to increase the frequency of litigation
over Subchapter S elections and termination rights in the context of the StrongArm power. Ultimately, this Comment suggests that, at the intersection of the
Tax and Bankruptcy Codes, there lies a strong argument for creating an
exception to the fraudulent conveyance doctrine for S corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment suggests that the enactment of Public Law 115-97 (Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act),1 first applicable for individual filer’s tax returns for fiscal year
2018,2 incentivizes a statistically significant number of the owners of over 4
million S corporations in the United States to convert their businesses into other
business forms.3 According to the Internal Revenue Service, “S corporations
became the most common corporate entity type in 1997,” and “continue to be
the most prevalent type of corporation.”4 While the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
directly amended the Internal Revenue Code, its effects in bankruptcy courts are
complicated. In particular, the Act impacts the scope of the fraudulent
conveyance doctrine under the Bankruptcy Code.
Under 11 U.S.C. (Bankruptcy Code)5 § 548 (Strong Arm power),6
liquidating trustees possess nearly unlimited power to avoid fraudulent transfers
of property or interests of the debtor in property made by debtors prior to filing
for bankruptcy protection.7 While some scholars have noted several solutions to
an “issue [arising] at the intersection of federal bankruptcy and tax law” may
warrant the creation of a Strong Arm clause exception,8 courts have recently
begun to adopt those suggestions, creating judicial uncertainty.9 The uncertainty

1

H.R. Con. Res. 1, 115th Cong., Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (enacted Dec. 22, 2017).
Matthew Frankel CFP, 2019 Tax Changes: Everything You Need to Know, THE MOTLEY FOOL, (Jan.
3, 2019), https://www.fool.com/taxes/2019/01/03/2019-tax-changes-everything-you-need-to-know.aspx.
3
See Bryce Welker, The Impact of the 2018 Tax Reform on Business Owners, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2018
9:00 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2018/03/14/the-impact-of-the-2018-tax-reform-on-businessowners/#4C9EB9647213; J. Michael Kolk, Another Look at C Corp. vs. S corp. in Light of Tax Reform, THE TAX
ADVISER, (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2018/aug/c-corp-s-corp-tax-reform.html
(“Considering that the top individual tax rate was dropped only to 37% (from 39.6%), even with the addition of
a 20% deduction for qualified business income (QBI) that can effectively lower the rate to 29.6%, many
passthrough taxpayers may be interested in possibly changing their businesses into C corporations.”).
4
SOI Tax Stats – S Corporation Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/
soi-tax-stats-s-corporation-statistics (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
5
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2019).
6
§ 548. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) (“The main thrust of § 70a(5) is to secure for
creditors everything of value the bankrupt may possess in alienable or leviable form when he files his petition.
To this end the term ‘property’ has been construed most generously and an interest is not outside its reach
because it is novel or contingent or because enjoyment must be postponed.”).
7
§ 548 (emphasis added).
8
Ian Follansbee, Is S-corp Tax Status “Property”? Two Recent Decisions Considered, 37-APR AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 26 (2018), available at WL 37-APR AMBKRIJ 26. See Camilla Berit Galesi, Shareholder’s
Rights Regarding Termination of a Debtor Corporation’s S Status in a Bankruptcy Setting, 10 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 157 (2001), Westlaw 10 JBKRLP 157.
9
See generally Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716
F.3d 736 (3d. Cir. 2013); Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc.), 578
2
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at issue, most recently addressed in Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States
(In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc.),10 concerns whether termination of 26 U.S.C.
(Tax Code) § 136111 small business corporation (S corporation) shareholder
elections under § 1362 constitute avoidable fraudulent transfers under the Strong
Arm power.12 Recently, two courts restricted the liquidating trustee’s nearly
unlimited Strong Arm power to avoid S election terminations,13 creating
inconsistent treatment in federal bankruptcy courts with the potential to morph
into a full blown circuit split.14
While relatively few opinions directly address the judicial uncertainty
discussed in this Comment, the courts and scholars who have considered the
issue sharply disagree on nuanced issues of statutory interpretation, competing
policy goals, and ultimately whether shareholders or the bankruptcy estate ought
to shoulder the capital gains burden arising from an S corporation’s asset
liquidation. This Comment suggests that the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act15 is likely to increase the frequency of litigation over Subchapter S elections
and termination rights in the context of the Strong Arm power.16 This Comment
examines prior holdings that have addressed the issue in light of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act’s potential impact on shareholders of S corporations moving
forward.
The following illustration, articulated by tax scholar Richard Shaw in Taxing
Shareholders on the Income of an S Corporation in Bankruptcy, distinguishes

B.R. 552 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
10
See, e.g., In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 560–61 (“The salient legal issue alleged is
whether the Debtors’ S corporation status was an interest in ‘property’ that was subject to transfer. If it is not,
then the election is not subject to the fraudulent transfer provisions of sections 544(b) and 548(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.”).
11
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (2018).
12
See, e.g., In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 560–61 (“The salient legal issue alleged is
whether the Debtors’ S corporation status was an interest in ‘property’ that was subject to transfer. If it is not,
then the election is not subject to the fraudulent transfer provisions of sections 544(b) and 548(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.”). See 26 U.S.C. § 1361.
13
See generally In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736; In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578
B.R. 552.
14
Circuit Split, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY, LAW.CORNELL.EDU, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
circuit_split (last visited Feb. 22, 2018) (“When two or more circuits in the United States court of appeals reach
opposite interpretations of federal law.”). While only the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Majestic Star
Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (3d. Cir. 2013) has ruled on the issue at the appellate level, adoption of contrasting
analysis that S corporation elections are revocable by bankruptcy trustees by another court of appeals would
create a full blown “circuit split.”
15
See H.R. Con. Res. 1, 115th Cong., Pub. L. No. 115-97, 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (enacted Dec.
22, 2017).
16
See infra Section III.A.
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the competing treatment of S corporation tax elections as either protected or
avoidable property interests in bankruptcy:
The only asset of Corporation X, an S corporation, is Blackacre, which
is raw land with a basis of $1 million and a fair market value of $2
million. X has two shareholders, A and B. X is in financial straits and
is about to file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy to stave off its
creditors. If X retains its status as an S corporation after going into
bankruptcy, the trustee may force a sale of Blackacre for $2 million
and apply the entire proceeds to satisfy the claims of creditors. Since
X is an S corporation, recognized gain from the sale is not subject to
tax at the corporate level. Instead, the gain recognized by the
corporation passes through and will be taxed to A and B under IRC
Section 1366. Since Subchapter S has shifted the tax obligation from
the corporation to its shareholders, the federal tax resulting from the
sale of Blackacre by the corporation will not be an obligation of the
bankruptcy estate, and would not be paid as a first priority
administrative expense of the estate under Bankruptcy Code Sections
503(a)(1)(B) and 507(a)(1). The unfortunate effect for the shareholders
is that the $2 million proceeds from the sale have been severed for the
benefit of creditors and are not made available to satisfy the $200,000
federal tax burden inherent in the recognized gain.17

Notably, in Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star
Casino, LLC), the Third Circuit recently found that permitting such unfortunate
burden shifting of tax liability to S corporation shareholders was based on
incorrect logic and contradicted multiple bankruptcy policy goals.18 The In re
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court tended to agree, asserting that “[t]he
Liquidating Trustee cannot hold the shareholders ‘tax hostage’ by avoiding their
decision to revoke the S corporation election.”19 While the In re Majestic Star
Casino, LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. decisions create outcomes
equitable to both creditors and the S corporation’s shareholders, they each rest
on a number of contested statutory interpretation and policy issues which, as
discussed later in this Comment, remain unresolved.
This Comment begins with a background discussion of the relevant sections
of the two federal codes involved in the judicial uncertainty at issue. First, it

17
See Richard A. Shaw, Taxing Shareholders on the Income of an S Corporation in Bankruptcy, 1 No. 6
Bus. Entities, Nov.–Dec. 1999, at * 41, available at 1999 WL 1419055 (emphasis added).
18
See generally In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736.
19
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 568
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
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discusses the Tax Code, followed by a discussion of the related Bankruptcy
Code sections in question and their relationship to the Tax Code. Next, this
Comment analyzes statutory interpretation issues and a number of related
conflicting Tax and Bankruptcy Code policy questions raised by courts,
scholars, and experts. This Comment then considers potential implications of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on S corporation shareholders, which raises additional
questions regarding previous court decisions.20 Indeed, the specific effects of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on S corporations and their shareholders highlight policy
considerations raised on both sides of this judicial uncertainty. Finally, this
Comment considers whether the implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
will cause more litigation in this area in the near future, and suggests that judicial
and legislative creation of a Tax Code § 1362 exception to the Bankruptcy Code
Strong Arm power for S corporation election rights provides an equitable
solution for both shareholders and creditors.21 In addition, the In re Health
Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court’s examination of the issue in light of tax-specific
statutory interpretation also increases its analytical value for future courts that
may encounter the issue, for many of whom the question will be an issue of first
impression.22 Ultimately, these policy considerations support the conclusion that
S elections pose unique challenges which should thus be excepted from the
Strong Arm power under the Bankruptcy Code.
I.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND AND LEGAL DOCTRINE

A. 26 U.S.C. §1361–62: The S Corporation—Overview
There are fundamental Tax Code differences between two types of
corporations, C corporations23 and § 1362 S corporations, relevant to the judicial
uncertainty concerning S corporation insolvencies discussed in this Comment.
The shareholders of C corporation business entities are generally not liable for
the business’s debts in bankruptcy.24 The “default”25 “C corporation” business
20

See infra Section III.A.
See, e.g., In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565.
22
See generally id. at 563. (applying “essential property rights” federal tax property test and noting that
only a small handful of courts have touched on this issue in even a cursory manner).
23
See 26 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(2) (2018) (“the term ‘C corporation’ means, with respect to any taxable year,
a corporation which is not an S corporation for such year.”).
24
See Follansbee, supra note 8, at 26 (“When a corporate entity elects to be treated as an S-corp, its
income tax liability is generally shifted to its shareholders, whereas without such an election, the corporation
remains liable for income taxes.”).
25
See generally In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 557 (“Under the Tax Code, the ‘default’
tax status for corporate entities in the United States is a subchapter C corporation status (‘C corporation
21
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structure refers to corporations generally,26 and is subject to double taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code: first at the corporate level as a tax-paying
entity separate from its shareholders, and then again at the shareholder level as
dividends distributed to its shareholders.27 Although subject to double taxation,
the C corporation generally shields the corporate entity’s shareholders from
exposure to personal liability for the entity’s debts in bankruptcy28—that is to
say that the business is a distinct legal entity from its owners.29
It gets more complicated for S corporations, which receive distinct corporate
tax treatment under Tax Code § 1361.30 After electing S corporation tax status,
“the entity itself pays no tax but its income, deductions, losses, and credits flowthrough to its shareholders, who must report those amounts in their personal
income tax returns.”31 While the “pass-through” capital gains liabilities for the
S corporation’s capital gains are paid by individual shareholders, shareholders’
agreements usually provide that the S corporation will reimburse each individual
shareholder for capital gains taxes of the business reported individually by its
shareholders.32

status’) . . . . The tax laws of subchapter C of Chapter 1, Title 26 of the Tax Code govern C corporation taxation.
C corporations are subject to two levels of taxation, or ‘double taxation,’ whereby the corporation’s net income
is taxed, and dividends to the shareholders are taxed as well.”) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1361) (emphasis added)).
26
See 26 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(2) (2018) (“C corporation. For purposes of this title, the term ‘C corporation’
means, with respect to any taxable year, a corporation which is not an S corporation . . . .”).
27
See 26 U.S.C. § 301 (2018).
28
See Ann M. Tabor, Gitlitz v. Commissioner: Windfall for Shareholders of an Insolvent S Corporation,
46 S.D. L. REV, 648, 654–55 (2000–2001) (citing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994, C892 ALI-ABA
597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994)).
29
See, e.g., Galesi, supra note 8, at 159.
30
See § 1361(a)(2) (“[T]he term ‘C corporation’ means, with respect to any taxable year, a corporation
which is not an S corporation for such year.”).
31
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 742
n.4 (3d. Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 576 n. 14 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc)).
32
See Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552,
565 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (“The logical consequence of the shareholders’ decision to elect S corporation status
is their decision to enter into a shareholders’ agreement requiring the corporation to make distributions from its
earnings to cover the amount of tax the shareholders incur on the income that is passed through to them.”);
Galesi, supra note 8, at 158.
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B. 26 U.S.C. §1362: The S Corporation—Elections and Terminations
1. Election and Shareholders’ Agreement
To qualify as an S corporation, an entity must first and foremost be eligible
to be a C corporation.33 However, S corporations are bound by several additional
eligibility requirements, which are codified at Tax Code §§ 1361–62.34 S
corporation status can only be implemented with a unanimous shareholder
election, according to § 1362(a)(2).35 Congress created the S corporation to
promote flexibility for shareholders, “intend[ing] the election of S corporation
status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of entity used to own
a business.”36 To elect S corporation tax treatment, Tax Code § 1361(b)(1)
requires that the entity first be a domestic corporation.37 According to
§ 1361(b)(1), the entity may not “have more than 100 shareholders,”38 or “have
more than 1 class of stock.”39 In addition, each of the entity’s shareholders must
be an individual person who is a resident of the United States.40
Due to the pass-through nature of S corporations, their shareholders’
agreements also usually provide for arrangements “requiring the corporation to
make distributions from its earnings to cover the amount of tax the shareholders
incur on the income that is passed through to them.”41 Such an arrangement “is
generally neutral as to the amount of tax a corporation would otherwise pay.”42
Describing the arrangement, the court in In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc. for
instance, noted that “[t]he benefit is to the shareholders—it allows them to avoid
double taxation.”43 Further, the court stated: “To the extent there is value
inherent in the S election, it is value Congress intended for the corporation’s

33

26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(1) (2018).
See § 1361 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018); In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565
(“Congress intended the election of S corporation status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of
entity used to own a business.”).
35
§ 1362(d)(2); Galesi, supra note 8, at 157.
36
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565 (“Congress intended the election of S corporation
status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of entity used to own a business.”). See 26 U.S.C.
§ 1361–62 (2018).
37
§ 1361(b)(1). See § 1361(b)(2), for a list of corporations that do not qualify for S status.
38
§ 1361(b)(1)(A).
39
§ 1361(b)(1)(D).
40
§ 1361(b)(1)(B)–(C).
41
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565.
42
Id.
43
Id.
34
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shareholders and not for the corporation.”44 Courts and scholars alike disagree,
however, about whether the value Congress intended for shareholders in creating
S corporations should be reallocated to the corporation’s creditors following an
asset liquidation sale in bankruptcy.45

2. Termination of Subchapter S Elections
The split of judicial certainty at issue focuses on the level of control
shareholders possess over the continued existence of S status. One area of
flexibility for shareholders electing to operate their business as an S corporation
is the ability to later elect to terminate S status,46 which can be accomplished
through a simple majority shareholder vote under § 1362(d) (the “S
termination”).47 However, this is not the only way S elections may be
terminated. Certain courts, scholars, and experts argue that S corporation
shareholders in fact lack complete control over the continued existence of the
status,48 because Tax Code § 1362(d)(2)(A) provides that the occurrence of
events completely outside the control of a majority of its shareholders
automatically terminate an S corporation’s existence.49
In In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, the Third Circuit, referencing Tax Code
§ 1361(b)(1), recognized that: “Even if the shareholders do not vote to revoke
their corporation’s S-corp status, any individual shareholder may at any time sell
his interest—without hindrance by the [Bankruptcy] Code or the [Tax Code]—
to another corporation, or to a nonresident alien, or to a number of new
individuals sufficient to increase the total number of shareholders to more than

44

Id.
See Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 234 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988);
Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-LinesWest, Inc.), 203 B.R. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996). See also
C. Chadwick Cullum, Note, A Majestic Vacation: The Third Circuit Takes a Break From the Modern Trend of
Including Subchapter S Elections in the Property of a Bankruptcy Estate, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 299 (2014).
46
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1362(d) (2018).
47
§ 1362(a)(1)–(2) (“An election under this subsection shall be valid only if all persons who are
shareholders in such corporation on the day on which such election is made consent to such election.”).
48
See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736,
756 (3d. Cir. 2013) (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 1361(a)(1); (b)(1)) (“Even if the shareholders do not vote to revoke
their corporation’s S-corp status, any individual shareholder may at any time sell his interest—without hindrance
by the Code or the I.R.C.—to another corporation, or to a nonresident alien, or to a number of new individuals
sufficient to increase the total number of shareholders to more than 100.”).
49
§ 1362(d)(2)(A). See also In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 756 (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 1361(a)(1), (b)(1)).
45
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100.”50 Accordingly, the entity would cease to qualify as an S corporation, as
stated in Tax Code § 1362(d)(2)(A).51
Moreover, an S corporation termination may also automatically occur—
against the will of the S corporation’s shareholders—if the conditions specified
in §1362(d)(3) are met, when the corporation “has accumulated earnings and
profits at the close of each of 3 consecutive taxable years,” and “has gross
receipts for each of such taxable years more than 25 percent of which are passive
investment income.”52 Courts addressing the judicial split have disputed whether
debtors possess the necessary “control” and “right to dispose” typical of
conventional property interests considered avoidable by bankruptcy trustees
under the Strong Arm power.53
C. Introduction to Bankruptcy Code: The Strong Arm Power
S corporation shareholders, like shareholders of C corporations, are third
parties with limited liability in bankruptcy.54 Nonetheless, in S corporation
bankruptcies, the tax status has the potential to impose a massive liability on
shareholders, even though its shareholders are not themselves insolvent
debtors.55 In chapter 7 or 11, a bankruptcy trustee may be appointed to liquidate
certain assets of the bankruptcy estate in an effort to create value for creditors to
cover outstanding debts and obligations.56 When courts hold that S elections are
property interests subject to the Strong Arm provision, shareholders remain
personally liable for the S corporation’s capital gains taxes assessed against
liquidated property, while proceeds of the liquidation are redirected only to
50

In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 756.
§ 1362(d)(2)(A).
52
§ 1362(d)(3)(A)(i)(I)–(II).
53
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 564
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017). Cf. Parker v. Saunders, (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 236 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1988). See generally § 1362(d)(1)(A)–(D).
54
See Ann M. Tabor, Gitlitz v. Commissioner: Windfall for Shareholders of an Insolvent S Corporation,
46 S. D. L. REV, 648, 654–55 (2000–2001) (citing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994, C892 ALI-ABA
597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994)).
55
See Galesi, supra note 8, at 159 (“The inequity for the shareholders lies in the fact that they are
51

liable for the capital gains tax, yet do not receive the income from which to pay the tax. Such a tax is
tantamount to an income tax that purports to tax an individual’s income when the individual has no
income.”). See also Shaw, supra note 17, at 46 (“In its haste to provide cash for creditors, the Ninth Circuit BAP
in Bakersfield [Westar] and the Tennessee Bankruptcy Court in . . . In re Trans–Lines West . . . are simply
creating a windfall for the bankruptcy estate at the expense of third parties who are not in the bankruptcy
proceeding.”).
56
See generally 11 U.S.C. Chapter 7, 11 (2019). Chapter 7 typically refers to liquidation, and chapter 11
refers to reorganization.
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creditors and the estate free and clear of tax liability.57 The relationship between
the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes is discussed in Sections C(1)–(3) of this
Comment, which follow.
1. 11 U.S.C. § 541: Broad Property of the Estate Interests
The language of Bankruptcy Code § 541, which establishes the bankruptcy
estate, is broad. Section 541(a) provides: “The commencement of a [bankruptcy
case] creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located and by whomever held.”58 Outside of the exceptions listed in
§§ 541(b)–(c),59 the estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor
in property as of the commencement of the case.”60 Section 541’s broad
language presents a challenge to a court’s ability to limit the trustee’s avoidance
power for equitable purposes, such as preventing the trustee from holding
shareholders “tax hostage.”61 Courts have determined that the definition of
“property” includes tangible and intangible property,62 although “property” is
not defined by the Bankruptcy Code.63 In Segal v. Rochelle,64 the Supreme Court
interpreted § 541’s statutory predecessor to include the “mere opportunity to
receive an economic benefit in the future” as property of the estate under the
Code,65 noting that “the term ‘property’ has been construed most generously and
an interest is not outside its reach because it is novel or contingent or because
enjoyment must be postponed.”66
Whether an S corporation’s election fits these sweeping § 541 interpretations
largely influences whether the election is subject to the bankruptcy trustee’s
avoidance power under Butner and Bankruptcy Code § 548.67 An important

57

Galesi, supra note 8, at 181.
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2019).
59
§ 541(b)–(c).
60
§ 541(a)(1).
61
See Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552,
568 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
62
§ 541(a); In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 561 (citing In re Kane, 628 F.3d 631, 637 (3d.
Cir. 2010)).
63
For an exhaustive list of terms which are defined by the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2019).
64
See generally Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
65
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 750
(3d. Cir. 2013) (quoting Segal, 382 U.S. at 379) (emphasis added); In re Fruehaul Trailer Corp., 444 F.3d 203,
211 (3d. Cir. 2006)).
66
Segal, 382 U.S. at 379 (alterations added) (internal citations omitted).
67
See infra Sections (B)(2–3).
58
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class of exceptions contained in § 541(b)68 concern Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) employee benefit plans and Tax Code § 414(d)
government plans.69 This Comment ultimately suggests that Tax Code § 1362
elections and Congress’s intended goals in enacting Subchapter S are similar to
ERISA benefit plans in many ways, warranting treatment as an exception to the
Strong Arm power in the Bankruptcy Code.
2. The Butner Principle: Countervailing Federal Interests
In Butner v. United States,70 the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy
encompasses all pre-petition debtor property rights according to state laws,
unless federal law requires a different result. The Butner court reasoned that
Congress “ha[d] generally left the determination of property rights in the assets
of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,”71 by omitting a definition of “property” in
the Bankruptcy Code. According to the Court, a debtor ought to be “afforded in
federal bankruptcy court the same protection he would have had under state law
if no bankruptcy case had ensued.”72
The Butner principle suggests that equivalent state and federal
interpretations of what constitutes property of the estate are proper in furtherance
of the following principles: “Uniform treatment of property interests by both
state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage
forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall merely by
reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.”73
Additionally, the Butner Court also highlighted the principle that: “[f]iling
for bankruptcy does not create new property rights or value where there
previously were none.”74 For instance, the In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC court
concluded that “the [Tax Code], rather than state law, governs the
characterization of entity tax status as a property interest for purposes of the

68

See § 541(b)(7)(B).
Id.
70
See generally Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
71
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 751
(3d. Cir. 2013) (citing Butner, 440 U.S. at 54).
72
Butner, 440 U.S. at 56 (articulating underlying policy consideration for application of state law in
defining property interests).
73
Id. at 55. (internal citation omitted).
74
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 750 (citing In re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 2012)
and Butner, 440 U.S. at 54).
69
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Bankruptcy Code,” due to the existence of a countervailing federal interest.75
The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court reached a similar conclusion.76
3. 11 U.S.C. § 548: The “Strong Arm” Provision—Actual Fraudulent
Transfers
While § 541 and the Butner principle define the bankruptcy estate,
Bankruptcy Code § 548 provides the trustee with avoidance powers to protect
the bankruptcy estate and its creditors from unlawful property transfers.77
Section 548 allows the avoidance of property transfers made with: (a) actual
fraudulent intent; and (b) constructively fraudulent intent.78 The judicial split
discussed in this Comment concerns actual fraudulent intent, not constructive
fraudulent intent.
a. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A): Actual Fraudulent Intent
One question arising in the area of judicial uncertainty at issue in this
Comment, whether termination of Tax Code §1361 elections constitute
avoidable fraudulent transfers under the Strong Arm power, concerns whether S
terminations amount to property transfers indicative of actual fraudulent intent
under § 548.79 Section 548(a)(1)(A) provides that “[t]he trustee may avoid any
transfer . . . of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation . . . incurred by the debtor” within two years of filing for bankruptcy
relief, “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud . . . .”80 Under § 101(54),
the term “transfer” means “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with (i) property; or (ii) an
interest in property.”81 In determining if the shareholder’s election of the S
corporation asset and its subsequent revocation prior to filing its bankruptcy
petition is a fraudulent conveyance, the initial inquiry concerns whether the

75

In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 752.
See Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552,
563 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (“In this case, federal tax law governs any purported property right at issue. Under
the Butner principle, there is clearly a countervailing federal interest because S corporation status is a creature
of federal law under subchapter S of the Tax Code.”).
77
See C. Chadwick Cullum, Note: A Majestic Vacation: The Third Circuit Takes a Break From the
Modern Trend of Including Subchapter S Elections in the Property of a Bankruptcy Estate, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV.
299, 305 (2014).
78
11 U.S.C § 548(a)(1) (2019).
79
See, e.g., In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 557.
80
§ 548(a)(1)(A).
81
Cullum, supra note 77, at 305 (citing 11 U.S.C § 101(54) (2019)).
76
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election and termination amount to a transferable property interest.82 Next, if the
S election is a property interest, the inquiry turns to whether the termination of
an S election amounts to a transfer of that property interest which a bankruptcy
trustee may revoke as a fraudulent conveyance made with “actual intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud.”83
The actual fraudulent requirement in § 548(a)(1)(A) is normally proven
through common law badges of fraud, with bankruptcy courts generally
requiring the liquidating trustee to prove more than one badge of fraud.84 In
Corzin v. DiGiammarino (In re Maglione), the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Ohio found actual fraudulent intent where a debtor had
transferred $30,000 in cash to his mother just before a divorce.85 The transfer
also occurred within two years of filing a petition for bankruptcy relief.86 The
court rejected the debtor’s contention that the purpose of the $30,000 transfer
was to satisfy an “antecedent debt,” because the evidence he offered could only
show the debt “would have been discharged more than a decade ago in a prior
bankruptcy, and would only have shown a remaining balance of less than $6,000
even if perfectly documented and never discharged.”87 Therefore the trustee
could avoid the transfer due to the presence of actual fraudulent intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud the bankruptcy estate and its creditors.88
D. Contentious Comparison: Are S Elections Similar to Net Operating Loss
Carry-forward/Carry-back Elections?
The judicial uncertainty examined in this Comment has been largely debated
based upon the question of whether S corporation terminations are analogous to
net operating losses (NOLs).89 NOLs, generally, “are created when the
82
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 570 (declining to address whether conveyance
amounted to a transfer because property inquiry was dispositive). Cf. Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re
Trans-Lines West, Inc.), 203 B.R. 661 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
83
See In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 661; Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re
Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736, 757–58 (3d. Cir. 2013); In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R
at 570 (declining to address whether conveyance amounted to a transfer because property inquiry was
dispositive).
84
Corzin v. DiGiammarino (In re Maglione), 559 B.R. 489, 495 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2016).
85
Id. at 501.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
See, e.g., Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d
736, 754–55, n.17 (3d. Cir. 2013) (“Trans-Lines West and the decisions that follow it extended Prudential Lines,
saying that the ability to make an S-corp election, like the ability to elect whether to carry forward or carry back
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taxpayer’s deductible business expenses for a given year exceed her net income
for that year[,]”90 but allow tax elections where “[c]arry[ing] the amount
back . . . and apply[ing] it against any taxable income . . . can generate an
immediate tax rebate.”91 In Segal, the Supreme Court held that elections to carryback net operating losses were property of the estate.92 The Segal Court,
“conceding the question to be close,”93 largely relied on the bankruptcy
principles that neither postponed enjoyment of property’s value, nor a
contingency to realization of the property’s value, could prevent NOL’s from
becoming property of the estate.94 The Court further reasoned that:
Unlike a pre-bankruptcy promise of a gift or bequest, passing title to
the trustee does not make it unlikely the gift or bequest will be effected.
Nor does passing the claim hinder the bankrupt from starting out on a
clean slate, for any administrative inconvenience to the bankrupt will
not be prolonged, . . . and the bankrupt without a refund claim to
preserve has more reason to earn income rather than less.95

In Gibson v. United States (In re Russell),96 the Eighth Circuit extended the
Segal decision,97 holding that carry-forward elections are also revocable
property interests.98 In In re Russell, the Court reasoned that carry-forward
elections similarly created value to creditors, making otherwise permanent
elections avoidable by liquidating trustees.99 The tax scholar Richard Shaw,100
noted that the In re Russell Court “emphasized that these avoidance powers are
exclusively geared toward protecting the rights of creditors and are so broad that

NOLs, is property. We think that extension untenable, though, for several reasons.”) (“We are not the only ones
to find the Trans-Lines West line of cases wanting.”) (internal citations omitted)).
90
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 753 n.14 (internal citations omitted); Gibson v. United
States (In re Russell), 927 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1991).
91
See, e.g., The Net Operating Loss Carryback and Carryforward, ACCOUNTING TOOLS (Aug. 11, 2017)
https://www.accountingtools.com/articles/2017/5/15/the-net-operating-loss-carryback-and-carryforward.
92
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 380 (1966).
93
Id. at 379.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 380 (internal citation omitted).
96
Gibson v. United States (In re Russell), 927 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1991).
97
See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736,
753–54 (3d. Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Russell, 927 F.2d at 417–18).
98
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 753–54; In re Russell, 927 F.2d at 415.
99
See In re Russell, 927 F.2d at 417–18; See Shaw, supra note 17, at 44 (“It emphasized that these
avoidance powers are exclusively geared toward protecting the rights of creditors and are so broad that they even
enable the trustee to avoid transfers otherwise considered irrevocable under the tax laws.”).
100
See Shaw, supra note 17, at 40.
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they even enable the trustee to avoid transfers otherwise considered irrevocable
under the tax laws.”101
II. BACKGROUND CIRCUIT SPLIT/JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY
First, this Comment examines judicial disputes on issues of statutory
interpretation and policy inconsistencies in the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes.102
One issue concerns § 548 and whether the S corporation tax attribute is valuable
property or a valuable interest of the debtor in property.103 If it is a property
interest, the second question concerns whether the shareholders’ ability to
terminate S corporation tax treatment amounts to a fraudulent “transfer” of a
property interest subject to avoidance under the Strong Arm power.104 The courts
in Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.)105 and Trans-Lines West,
Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-Lines West, Inc.),106 found the Subchapter S tax
attributes to be revocable property interests. Rejecting possible shareholder
inequality concerns, the In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. and In re Trans-Lines
West, Inc. courts opted to treat S terminations as avoidable property interests.107
As a result, the Courts permitted liquidating trustees to create value for creditors
by distorting the economics of bankruptcy to shift capital gain liability from
asset liquidation to shareholders, who, because they are not parties to the
bankruptcy proceeding, otherwise would not be liable.108 In contrast, the courts
in In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC109 and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.110
101

Shaw, supra note 17, at 44 (citing In re Russell, 927 F.2d 413).
See discussion infra ANALYSIS Section A.
103
See Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-Lines West, Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 661 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1996); In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 757–58; Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States
(In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 570 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (declining to address whether
conveyance amounted to a transfer because property inquiry was dispositive).
104
11 U.S.C. § 548 (2019). See, e.g., In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565. Although a U.S.
Circuit Court has not addressed pre-petition S elections directly, the Third Circuit departed from years of
precedent and found a post-petition revocation of S classification of a subsidiary was not property of the estate.
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
previously held that the election was property of the debtor-corporation which could be avoided by the Trustee.
Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 239 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
105
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 235.
106
In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 663.
107
See generally In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 230; In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at
660.
108
See, e.g., In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 757–58; In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R.
at 661; In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 570 (declining to address whether conveyance amounted
to a transfer because property inquiry was dispositive). See Shaw, supra note 17, at 46.
109
See generally In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 763.
110
See generally In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 570.
102
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disagreed, concluding that S termination rights were not ‘property’ interests that
could have been transferred; nor were the S terminations subject to avoidance
under the fraudulent conveyance doctrine.111 The In re Majestic Star Casino,
LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. opinions remedy a number of
inequalities for shareholders and promote the Butner principles more effectively
in consideration of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, as discussed later in this
Comment.
A. Decisions Finding S Corporation Elections Within Strong Arm Power
The In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. courts
each found that shareholder termination of S elections fit the definition of
“property of the estate” under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code subject to the
trustee’s avoidance under § 548 as fraudulent conveyances.112 The In re TransLines West, Inc. court held that S-elections were property rights, much like Net
Operating Losses.113 The In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. court adopted the same
NOL analogy and found actual fraudulent intent in “taxpayer manipulation of
the Tax Code.”114
1. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Tennesee: In re TransLines West, Inc.
The first court to address whether a trustee could avoid shareholder Selection termination was the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee in the case of Trans-Lines West, Inc., v. Lines. (In re TransLines West, Inc.).115 The debtor and Internal Revenue Service contended that the
“revocation of its Subchapter S status does not constitute a ‘transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property’ under . . . § 548(a) or a fraudulent conveyance under
[state law].”116 First, the court initially considered whether an S corporation

111

See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 570; In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at

757.
112
See In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 236 (“Thus, the decision to revoke the debtor’s
subchapter S status appears to reflect careful tax planning, and the Revocation appears to represent an effort by
the Saunders to manipulate the bankruptcy system to their personal advantage under the guise of professional
tax planning.”); In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 663 (“Given the Bankruptcy Code’s broad definition
of ‘transfer’ and the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Russell, this court holds that the Debtor’s prepetition revocation
of its Subchapter S status constitutes a ‘transfer’ under § 548(a).”).
113
See id. at 661–62.
114
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 235–36.
115
See generally In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. 653.
116
Id. at 660–61 (alterations in original).
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election was a property interest. Only then would the court consider whether that
property interest had been fraudulently conveyed.117
To decide the initial question of what constitutes property, the In re TransLines West, Inc. court relied upon the following dictionary definition of
property:
As a matter of legal definition, “property” refers not to a particular
material object but to the right and interest or domination rightfully
obtained over such object, with the unrestricted right to its use,
enjoyment and disposition. In other words, [in] its strict legal sense
“property” signifies that dominion or indefinite right of use, control,
and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things
or objects; thus “property” is nothing more than a collection of
rights.118

The court found that S termination rights under Tax Code § 1362 “affords a
corporation which has elected the Subchapter S status a guaranteed, indefinite
right to use, enjoy, and dispose of that status[,]” making it a property interest.119
Section 1362(c) of the Tax Code provides that an S-election continues
indefinitely unless it is terminated under any of the three termination
possibilities articulated in § 1362(d).120 Regarding the first two elements—the
right to “use” and to “enjoy”—the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. court reasoned
that “once a corporation elects to be treated as an S corporation, [Tax Code]
§ 1362(c) guarantees and protects the corporation’s right to use and enjoy that
status until it is terminated . . . .”121 Regarding the third element in the dictionary
definition, “disposition,” the court found that the shareholder’s right to terminate
the S corporation under § 1362(d)(1)(A), “guarantees and protects an S
corporation’s right to dispose of that status at will[,]” providing the unilateral
control necessary to be considered property.122
After initially finding that S corporation terminations under Tax Code
§ 1362 were property interests, the court examined whether the elections were
‘transferrable’ to third parties within the meaning of the fraudulent conveyance

117

Id. at 661.
See id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing 63A AM. JUR. 2d Property § 1 (1984); Property,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
119
See In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 661; Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (6th ed.
1990) (internal citations omitted).
120
26 U.S.C. § 1362(c)–(d) (2018).
121
In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 662.
122
Id. at 661–62.
118
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doctrine.123 The court analogized the majority vote to terminate S elections to
elections to carryforward NOLs, much like in In re Russell.124 The court
concluded that S elections are transferrable property interests, because they each
effectively: “[A]chieved the same purpose: the potential increase of the debtor’s
tax liability.”125
Where the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. court reasoned that Tax Code § 1362
“affords a corporation which has elected the Subchapter S status a guaranteed,
indefinite right”126 of unilateral control over S status, future courts should reach
a different conclusion.127 One expert, Richard Pope observed:
No such guarantee exists in Subchapter S, nor can it be reasonably
inferred from any language in Subchapter S . . . . Most importantly,
none of the Subchapter S sections constitute, or define, any limitations
or restrictions upon the shareholders of the S corporation, in acting or
failing to act as to the entity’s S corporation status.128

Another expert, Camila Galesi, author of Shareholders’ Rights Regarding
Termination of a Debtor Corporation’s S Status in a Bankruptcy Setting,
remarked:
[I]t is clear that the nature of a corporation’s interest in its S status is
dependent upon, and subordinate to, the tax considerations of the
shareholders. The implications of the nature of the corporation’s
interest in S status for the S status termination issue is that the debtor
S corporation does not have the requisite property interest in its S
status to mandate inclusion of the S status in the bankruptcy estate
under the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.129

123

Id. at 663.
See id. at 662–63 (citing Gibson v. United States (In re Russell), 927 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
an election to carry forward net operating losses was a transfer under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a))).
125
Id. at 663.
126
Id. at 661; see Galesi, supra note 8, at 162 (referring to the Trans-West decision as an “erroneous
conception”); Wm. Robert Pope, S Corporation Federal Tax Status—Property of the Bankruptcy Estate?, 2013
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 1, 5 (7th ed. 2013) (“Most importantly, none of the Subchapter S sections
constitute, or define, any limitations or restrictions upon the shareholders of the S corporation, in acting or failing
to act as to the entity’s S corporation status.”).
127
See In re Trans-Lines West, Inc., 203 B.R. at 661; see also Galesi, supra note 8; Pope, supra note 126.
128
Pope, supra note 126.
129
Galesi, supra note 8.
124
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2. 9th Cir. B.A.P.: In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.
Two years later, in Parker v. Saunders, (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), the
United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit considered
whether termination of S corporation treatment thirteen days130 prior to filing a
bankruptcy petition amounted to a fraudulent transfer.131 The court also relied
on the Trans-Lines West court’s dictionary definition of “property,” allowing the
trustee to avoid the shareholders’ employment of a § 1362 S termination option
as a fraudulently transferred property interest rightfully belonging to the
bankruptcy estate.132
The court relied on Segal v. Rochelle,133 which “declin[ed] to exclude the
right to NOL carry forwards from [the] definition of property merely because
[the] right was intangible and not yet reduced to a tax refund.”134 In In re
Bakersfield Westar, Inc., if the shareholders of an S corporation, Bakersfield
Westar, Inc., had been permitted to terminate its prior election to be taxed as an
S corporation, creditors of the bankruptcy estate would have been liable for the
$400,000 of capital gain liability arising from the liquidation of Bakersfield
Westar, Inc.’s assets. 135 However, the court held that the revocation created
value and therefore was an avoidable property interest,136 permitting the trustee
to “Strong Arm” the company back into an S corporation with pass-through tax
characteristics, which shifted the $400,000 capital gain liability to the
corporation’s two individual shareholders.137
Having found a property interest, the In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. court
also held that the revocation of an S election was a transfer, making it an
avoidable fraudulent transfer made within two years of filing for bankruptcy.138
The court found actual fraudulent intent, reasoning that the shareholders of the
debtor, Bakersfield Westar, Inc., had revoked the election in an apparent “effort
by the [shareholders] to manipulate the bankruptcy system to their personal

130
See Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 229 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the debtor submitted its revocation on Feb. 1, 1994 and filed a bankruptcy petition on Feb. 14, 1994).
131
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 229.
132
Id. at 233–34.
133
Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
134
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 234 (citing Segal, 382 U.S. at 379).
135
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 234 (citing Segal, 382 U.S. at 379).
136
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 234 (citing Segal, 382 U.S. at 379).
137
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 234 (citing Segal, 382 U.S. at 379).
138
Id. at 236.

DOUGHERTYPROOFS_4.30.20

318

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/3/2020 4:51 PM

[Vol. 36

advantage under the guise of professional tax planning.”139 The court indicated
that “careful tax planning,” such as conferring with an accountant before
revoking the election, was a badge of a § 548 conveyance with actual fraudulent
intent.140
B. Decisions Finding S Corporation Elections Are an Exception to Strong
Arm Power
Recognizing the inequity to shareholders created by decisions that permit
liquidating trustees to hold S corporation shareholders tax-hostage, the courts in
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.141 and In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC142 each
carved out Strong Arm power exceptions for S corporation elections.143 Tax
Code § 1362 effectively allows shareholders to terminate Subchapter S tax
treatment any time by either: (i) outright revocation or (ii) transferring
ownership to a disqualified party under § 1361(b), such as a non-resident alien
or a corporate entity, thereby disqualifying the entity as an S-corporation.144 By
creating Strong Arm power exceptions and allowing S corporation shareholders
to exercise Tax Code § 1362 termination rights to block capital gain taxes from
liquidation sales from passing through to shareholders, each opinion has the
effect of preventing trustees from unlawfully holding shareholders ‘tax
hostage.’145
1. Third Circuit: In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC
In In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC,146 the Third Circuit directed sharp
criticism at the opinions of the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield
Westar, Inc. courts, which assumed that electing S corporation tax treatment
guaranteed shareholders unilateral control over a property interest.147 The Court

139

Id.; see also Shaw, supra note 17, at 45.
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 236–37.
141
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc.), 578 B.R. 552 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2017).
142
Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736 (3d.
Cir. 2013).
143
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565; In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 757;
cf. 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2019).
144
Galesi, supra note 8, at 157 (internal citation omitted).
145
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 568; see also Galesi, supra note 8, at 157 (internal
citation omitted).
146
See In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 736.
147
Id. at 756–57.
140
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ultimately found that wholly-owned subsidiaries of S corporations, (“Q subs”)148
are neither property of the estate149 nor within the scope of the Strong Arm power
of bankruptcy trustees.150 In contrast with the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. opinions (which held that Subchapter S election
and termination rights fell within the Strong Arm power due to their similarity
to NOL’s), the In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC Court noted several critical
distinctions between NOL’s and S elections, ultimately excepting S elections
from avoidance.151
First, where the In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. court determined that the
contingent nature of a property right “does not place it outside the definition of
‘property,’”152 the In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC Court found that S
corporation elections were too contingent to amount to estate property,
reasoning that: “Even accepting that this will sometimes be the case, not all
contingencies are of equal magnitude or consequence.”153 Therefore, the Court
found that, relatively, NOLs “are hardly contingent at all,”154 because only one
contingency exists in the election to carry forward or carry back NOLs, while
elections for S corporation tax treatment are “entirely contingent on the will of
the shareholders[,]” placing them outside the definition of estate property.155
Second, the Court determined that the ability to elect S corporation tax
treatment was not a valuable property interest like an election to carry forward
and carry back NOLs, because NOLs can actually be valued and monetized in
bankruptcy through the physical sale of the NOL, conferring value to the
purchasing organization, while Subchapter S tax treatment cannot.156
Third, the Court disagreed with the Trans-Lines West court’s assumption
that electing S corporation tax treatment guaranteed shareholders unilateral

148
See 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b)(3)(B) (2018); see also In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 743 n.6,
for discussion of historical background concerning enactment of Q Subs, statutory requirements and regulatory
implications.
149
See In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 755.
150
See id. at 755–58. While the case tangentially concerned 11 U.S.C. § 549 post-petition transfers, the
majority of the analysis concerns whether S-corps and Q-subs constitute property, which it determined to be the
dispositive issue. Id. at 752–63.
151
Id. at 755–58.
152
Id. at 755 (citing Parker v. Saunders, (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 234 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis added).
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 755–56 .

DOUGHERTYPROOFS_4.30.20

320

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/3/2020 4:51 PM

[Vol. 36

control to exercise termination rights.157 While the Trans-Lines West court
reasoned that “once a corporation elects to be treated as an S corporation, [the
Tax Code] guarantees and protects the corporation’s right to use and enjoy that
status . . . [as well as the] right to dispose of that status at will,” the In re Majestic
Star Casino, LLC Court described the statement as an “incomplete and
inaccurate understanding of the law.”158 The Court reasoned that the right to use
the S election tax asset was not guaranteed, because, in addition to outright
revocation, the occurrence of multiple events may cause S corporations to
terminate entirely against the will of its shareholders, such as a single
shareholder’s sale of their interest to a corporate entity or to a nonresident
alien.159
Fourth, the limited value created by shifting tax liability to the non-debtor
shareholders is insufficient to “override rights statutorily granted to shareholders
to control the tax status of the entity they own.”160
Fifth, the court recognized that treating S elections like NOL carry forward
elections produces substantial inequities to shareholders, as well as a windfall
for creditors which would not otherwise be available but for the happenstance
of an S corporation entering bankruptcy.161
2. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia: In re Health
Diagnostic Lab., Inc.
In In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.,162 recognizing that neither the
Bankruptcy Code nor applicable case law provided a sufficient definition to
either include or exclude elections for S corporation tax treatment from the
Strong Arm power, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia deferred to the Butner principle for guidance.163 Ultimately, the court
determined that, because the salient question concerned an inconsistency

157
Id. at 756 (referencing Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-LinesWest, Inc.), 203 B.R. 662
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996)).
158
Id.
159
Id. at 755–56.
160
Id. at 757.
161
Id. at 757–58.
162
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2017).
163
Id. at 562 (applying Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
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between the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes, two federal statutes, a countervailing
federal interest indeed existed.164
The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court applied a new federal property
test, previously applied by the Fourth Circuit in contested Tax Code property
questions relating to the Bankruptcy Code, to determine whether S corporation
terminations under the Tax Code should amount to avoidable property interests
in bankruptcy.165 The test is based on the Fourth Circuit’s recognition “that
certain interests constitute ‘property’ for federal tax purposes when they embody
‘essential property rights . . . .’”166 The Fourth Circuit’s property rights test
(Essential Property Rights Test) consists of six factors, as opposed to the threefactor dictionary test applied in Trans-Lines West.167 The Essential Property
Rights Test notably includes the breadth of control which the taxpayers may
actually exercise, in addition to the rights to receive income for the S status as
elements, which the Trans-Lines West decision’s three-part dictionary test failed
to address.168 The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court’s Essential Property
Rights Test is comprised of six factors:
(1) the right to use; (2) the right to receive income produced by the
purported property interest; (3) the right to exclude others; (4) the
breadth of the control the taxpayer can exercise over the purported
property; (5) whether the purported property right is valuable; and (6)
whether the purported right is transferable . . . . A reviewing court
must weigh those factors in order to determine whether the interest in
S corporation status constitutes “property” for federal tax purposes.169

The court found that only the first element, the “right to use,” leaned in favor of
characterizing S elections as property.170

164

Id. at 563 (quoting Butner, 440 U.S. at 55).
Id.
166
Id.
167
See id.; cf. Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-Lines West, Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 661 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1996) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (1984);
Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
168
See generally In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 566–67.
169
Id. at 563 (citing Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Comm’r, 639 F.3d 129, 140 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (internal citations to Va. Historic Tax Credit Fund and
Craft omitted).
170
See id. at 565–66 (“[T]he Liquidating Trustee contends that there is postpetition value to this ability of
the Debtors to avoid directly paying taxes on their own income. The Trustee argues that it is this value that
makes the Debtors’ S corporation status an interest in property. But this rationale runs afoul of the prohibition
against creating in bankruptcy ‘new property rights or value where there previously were none.’”) (quoting In
re Messina, 687 F.3d 74, 82 (3d Cir. 2012)).
165
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However, the court explained that the “right to use” element, standing alone,
was not enough to justify classifying S elections and their revocations as
property.171 The court reasoned that “the ‘right to use’ is the weakest of the
‘essential property rights.’ Without the rights of control and disposition, the right
to use is devoid of any meaningful property interest . . . .”172 The court explained
that the “right to use,” in absence of the rights to control and disposition, is not
meaningful, much like “the right to use a tool borrowed from a neighbor[,]”173
quoting the Fifth Circuit decision TMT Procurement Corp. v. Vantage Drilling
Co., (In re TMT Procurement).174 In In re TMT Procurement, the Fifth Circuit
similarly “reject[ed] the debtor’s argument that shares of stock it had been
allowed to use to establish adequate collateral were ‘property of the estate,’”
when the debtor had neither the right to control or retain those shares.175
The court similarly reasoned that the shareholders of S corporations indeed
possessed the “right to use” the S status.176 However, unlike the prior In re
Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. decisions, the In re
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court found that S corporation shareholders lacked
control rights and disposition rights for the S corporation tax status.177
Accordingly, the right to control the tax asset existed when the shareholders
initially elected the S corporation status up until the shareholders revoked it; at
that point, the shareholders, who are non-debtors and therefore not parties to the
bankruptcy proceeding, no longer possessed control of the contested property
status.178 The court found that the other factors in the Essential Property Rights
Test weighed against bringing the election into the bankruptcy estate.179
Therefore, the court reasoned that the corporation could “use the S corporation
tax status to pass their tax liability through to their shareholders.”180
While demanding the return of the shareholders’ tax refunds could create
value for the estate, the court rejected that element’s determinativeness, instead
171

In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563–64.
Id.
173
See id. at 564 (citing In re TMT Procurement Corp. v. Vantage Drilling Co., 764 F.3d 512, 523–26
(5th Cir. 2014)).
174
See generally id. (referencing In re TMT Procurement Corp., 764 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2014)).
175
See id. (quoting In re TMT Procurement Corp., 764 F.3d 512, 523–26 (5th Cir. 2014)).
176
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 564.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 565.
179
See id. at 564 (“Only one of the factors identified by the Fourth Circuit leans in favor of classifying S
corporation tax status as property. That is the Debtors’ ability to use the S corporation tax status to pass their tax
liability through to their shareholders.”).
180
Id. at 565.
172
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reasoning that that value did not create a property right in the tax attribute.181
The court analogized the situation to Wornick v. Gaffney, a Second Circuit case
which held that “a beneficiary of a life insurance policy ‘has no legal or equitable
interest in the policy that could be made part of the property of the beneficiary’s
bankruptcy estate.’”182 In the Second Circuit, for instance “[i]t has long been the
law that ‘[t]he beneficiary of a life insurance policy, who may at any time be
removed from the benefited position by the insured and against the beneficiary’s
will, cannot have a vested interest.’”183 Thus, not each and every single item of
value must necessarily fall within the “property” definition subject to avoidance
under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This Comment suggests that future courts addressing S terminations in the
context of the Strong Arm Power should apply the Essential Property Rights
Test. Courts would do well to apply this test because, in response to the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act, a statistically significant number of S corporation elections are
likely to be terminated in favor of treatment as standard C corporations. As a
result of the Act, the amended Tax Code uniformly assesses tax rates upon C
corporation shareholders similar to, if not lower than, the tax rates assessed on
S corporation shareholders, without the risk of being held tax hostage in
bankruptcy.184 Thus, the certainty and consistency offered by the Essential
Property Rights Test warrants wider consideration by future courts outside the
Fourth Circuit, for many of whom these questions will be an area of first
impression.
III. ANALYSIS
A. 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Implications for S Corporations and
Shareholders
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), first applicable for individual
filer’s in the spring tax returns of fiscal year 2018,185 is likely to the increase
frequency of litigation over Subchapter S elections and termination rights in the
context of the Strong Arm power. The TCJA impacts S corporations and
shareholders in unique ways, magnifying inequalities to S corporation
181

Id.
Id. (citing Wornick v. Gaffney, 544 F.3d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 2008)).
183
Wornick, 544 F.3d at 490 (citing In re Greenberg, 271 F. 258, 259 (2d Cir. 1921)).
184
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563 n.19.
185
Matthew Frankel CFP, 2019 Tax Changes: Everything You Need to Know, THE MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 3,
2019), https://www.fool.com/taxes/2019/01/03/2019-tax-changes-everything-you-need-to-know.aspx.
182
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shareholders in bankruptcy courts declining to adopt an exception to the trustees’
avoidance power for Subchapter S termination rights.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which cut corporate income tax rate from thirtyfive percent186 to a permanent twenty-one percent flat rate for C corporations,187
in many instances, has decreased corporate income tax to a level lower than the
individual rates assessed against shareholders of S corporations.188 Since
individual tax rates under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act have remained assessed on
a temporary graduating scale ranging from ten to thirty-seven percent, this
Comment reasons that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is likely to cause a statistically
significant portion of S corporation shareholders to terminate Subchapter S
elections for legitimate tax planning purposes.189
For pass-through businesses like S corporations, which are not otherwise
subject to the corporate income tax,190 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act allows
individual shareholders to deduct up to twenty percent from personal tax filings
for Qualified Business Income (QBI Deductions) under 26 U.S.C. § 199A, to
compensate for the balance of corporate income tax liability now incurred at
individual rates.191 However, a number of usage limitations on QBI Deductions,
such as dollar cap limitations and limitations on the business activities which
pass-through entities may conduct, will likely lead shareholders of S
corporations to reach agreements revoking elections for Subchapter S tax
treatment in order to revert entities to C corporations.192 Moreover, while the
186
Summary: H.R.1 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV (2017), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1 (“This section reduces the corporate tax rate from a maximum of 35% under the
existing graduated rate structure to a flat 21% rate for tax years beginning after 2017.”); see also Alistair M.
Nevius, How Tax Overhaul Would Change Business Taxes, J. OF ACCT., (Oct. 23, 2018, 11:38 PM), https://www.
journalofaccountancy.com/news/2017/dec/tax-reform-bill-changes-for-businesses-201718071.html.
187
26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2018) (“The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be 21 percent of
taxable income.”).
188
See Welker, supra note 3; J. Michael Kolk, Another Look at C Corp. vs. S corp. in Light of Tax Reform,
THE TAX ADVISER (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2018/aug/c-corp-s-corp-tax-reform.
html (“Considering that the top individual tax rate was dropped only to 37% (from 39.6%), even with the addition
of a 20% deduction for qualified business income (QBI) that can effectively lower the rate to 29.6%, many
passthrough taxpayers may be interested in possibly changing their businesses into C corporations.”).
189
Summary: H.R.1 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV (2017), https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1 (“Unless otherwise specified, provisions referred to in this summary as
temporary or as a suspension of an existing provision apply for taxable years beginning after December 31,
2017, and before January 1, 2026.”).
190
Scott Greenberg, Reforming the Pass-Through Deduction, TAX FOUNDATION (June 21, 2018),
https://taxfoundation.org/reforming-pass-through-deduction-199a/.
191
See Welker, supra note 3. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 199A (2018) (allowing the deduction to
compensate for the balance of corporate income tax liability now incurred at individual rates).
192
See Welker, supra note 3; Kolk, supra note 188.
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lowered corporate income tax rate of twenty-one percent for C corporations is
permanent, the availability of the QBI Deduction for pass-through entities will
expire in 2025 pursuant to the terms of § 199A(2)(i),193 raising additional
questions regarding the longevity of the S corporation’s usefulness.194
Furthermore, according to CPA J. Michael Kolk of the Tax Adviser, even
where S corporations are not disqualified by QBI Deduction usage limitations,
“[c]onsidering that the top individual tax rate was dropped only to 37% (from
39.6%), even with the addition of a 20% [QBI Deductions] that can effectively
lower the rate to 29.6%, many pass-through taxpayers may be interested in
possibly changing their businesses into C corporations[,]” despite double
taxation implications.195 The resulting increase in shareholders terminating S
corporations may require either legislators or courts to craft an exception to the
Bankruptcy Code Strong Arm power for Tax Code § 1362 S terminations.196
B. Policy Considerations Support Creation of S Corporation Exception to
Strong Arm Power
This Comment suggests that the In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. opinions, which concluded that Tax Code § 1361
elections and § 1362 S terminations should be excepted from the § 548 Strong
Arm power to avoid fraudulent conveyances under the Bankruptcy Code, more
effectively promote Congress’s intent in enacting both the Tax and Bankruptcy
codes.197 In addition, the In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court’s application
of the Essential Property Rights Test provides an especially persuasive analysis
of Subchapter S Tax Code elections in bankruptcy198 in consideration of the
193

§ 199A(i).
See Tabor, supra note 28, at 654 (“gained popularity in 1986 when federal income tax rates on
corporations were higher than for individuals.”) (referencing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994, C892
ALI-ABA 597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994)); cf. Kolk, supra note 188.
195
See Kolk, supra note 188.
196
See H.R. Con. Res. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted); Pub. L. No. 115-97, 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017)
(enacted); Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc.), 578 B.R. 552 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2017); Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d
736 (3d Cir. 2013). See generally Third Circuit Narrowly Construes Doctrine of Equitable Mootness, AKIN
GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/thirdcircuit-narrowly-construes-doctrine-of-equitable-mootness.html (referring to “the bankruptcy-influential United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit”).
197
See In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d 736 (deciding that S corporation status is not revocable
by the Liquidating Trustee in context of deciding that Qsubs are not revocable).
198
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563 n. 19 (“The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Historic
Tax Credit Fund utilized the analysis from United States v. Craft to determine whether the interest at issue
classified as ‘property’ for section 707 of the Tax Code . . . . While Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund concerned
194
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sweeping changes ushered in by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The decisions of the
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. courts
are also consistent with the Butner principle, among other principles, from which
the Trans-Lines West and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. courts either
substantially departed or declined to address.199
First, “careful tax planning” is not penalized in either the Tax or Bankruptcy
Codes and should not be penalized moving forward in light of changes to the tax
landscape ushered by the TCJA. Second, preventing trustees from revoking S
terminations as fraudulent conveyances serves to reduce uncertainty in an area
where a countervailing federal interest in uniformity exists, by both mitigating
inequality to non-debtor shareholders of insolvent S corporations in addition to
allowing creditors to recover. Third, an exception to the Strong Arm provision
allowing shareholders to terminate S elections prevents a windfall to creditors
merely by the coincidence of an S corporation’s bankruptcy. Fourth, Congress’s
intent in creating the S corporation, as well as the terms of §§ 1361–62 of the
Tax Code, suggest that S corporations are similar enough to an enumerated
exception to the Strong Arm power, ERISA retirement plans, to warrant a similar
exception for S corporation election and termination rights. Fifth, the application
of the Essential Property Rights Test to tax-specific disputes in bankruptcy
presents a useful analytical tool for courts moving forward, serving to prevent
uncertainty, forum shopping, and prohibited creditor windfalls, warranting
greater adoption by courts outside the Fourth Circuit.
1. Careful Tax Planning is Not Penalized in Other Areas Within the
Bankruptcy Code
The sweeping changes to the taxation of corporations and pass-through
entities in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, at the very least, call the In re Bakersfield
Westar, Inc. court’s characterization of “careful tax planning” as indicative of
actual fraudulent intent into question.200 In consideration of the present
section 707 of the Tax Code, the Court finds the analysis and balancing test applicable to this case. Courts have
repeatedly applied the Craft analysis to several different federal statutes.”) (citing Greene v. Savage (In re
Greene), 583 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1)); Wallace v.
Rogers (In re Rogers), 513 F.3d 212, 223–24 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying the Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(p)(1)); In re Conrad, 544 B.R. 568, 571–73 (Bankr. D. Md. 2016) (applying the Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(3)(B)); United States v. Towne, 406 F.Supp.2d 928, 935 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying the Craft analysis
to 26 U.S.C. § 6321)).
199
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565–70; see infra notes 208, 225, 228, 234, 260,
261 and accompanying text.
200
See Kolk, supra note 188; c.f. Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 236
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uncertainty surrounding tax changes, especially concerning the indeterminate
viability of QBI Deductions, careful tax planning appears not only perfectly
legitimate, but also necessary for many businesses concerned about the declining
usefulness of the S corporation business organization.201 Since C corporation
shareholders could ultimately pay less income tax than shareholders of S
corporations despite double-taxation,202 preventing trustees from strong-arming
shareholders of small business corporations into a tax hostage scenario seems to
appropriately promote consistency and fairness in an area of federal interest.203
In creating the S corporation, “Congress intended the election of S
corporation status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of entity
used to own a business.”204 One expert, Camila Berit Galesi, remarked that: “Of
course, no shareholder would elect S status for the corporation if it meant that
only the tax liability would be passed through to the shareholders, but that the
cash would never be received by them.”205 Ultimately, the In re Trans-Lines
West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. courts permitted trustees to avoid
S terminations as “careful tax planning,” or a similar maneuver to defraud
creditors.206 However, those characterizations are inconsistent with the amended
Tax Code, which arguably incentivizes shareholders to abandon Subchapter S
in its entirety.207 As a result, excepting S terminations from the Strong Arm
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (finding “careful tax-planning” as actual fraudulent intent).
201
See 26 U.S.C. § 199A (2018); Welker, supra note 3; see also Kolk, supra note 188 (“Considering that
the top individual tax rate was dropped only to 37% (from 39.6%), even with the addition of a 20% deduction
for qualified business income (QBI) that can effectively lower the rate to 29.6%, many passthrough taxpayers
may be interested in possibly changing their businesses into C corporations.”); cf. Tabor, supra note 28, at 654
(noting that the S corporation tax attribute “gained popularity in 1986 when federal income tax rates on
corporations were higher than for individuals.”) (referencing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994, C892
ALI-ABA 597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994)).
202
See 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2018) (“The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be 21 percent of
taxable income.”); Summary: H.R.1 — 115th Congress (2017–2018), CONGRESS.GOV (2017), https://www.
congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1. (“This section reduces the corporate tax rate from a maximum of
35% under the existing graduated rate structure to a flat 21% rate for tax years beginning after 2017.”); Nevius,
supra note 187.
203
See In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 236 (“Thus, the decision to revoke the debtor’s
subchapter S status appears to reflect careful tax planning, and the Revocation appears to represent an effort by
the Saunders to manipulate the bankruptcy system to their personal advantage under the guise of professional
tax planning”).
204
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565 (“Congress intended the election of S corporation
status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of entity used to own a business.”).
205
Galesi, supra note 8, at 181.
206
See In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 236; Trans-Lines West, Inc. v. Lines (In re Trans-Lines
West, Inc.), 203 B.R. 653 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996).
207
See Welker, supra 3; Kolk, supra note 188 (“Considering that the top individual tax rate was dropped
only to 37% (from 39.6%), even with the addition of a 20% deduction for qualified business income (QBI) that
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power may indeed be the only path consistent with Congress’s original goal of
providing owners of S corporation’s with more freedom.208
Long before the corporate income tax became lower than that for individual
taxpayers, tax scholar Richard Shaw209 noted that:
The revocation of the S election in connection with the bankruptcy
merely assures that during the bankruptcy, the tax burden from the sale
of assets or from the operation of a business during bankruptcy will
follow and be applied to the entity recognizing the gain or earning
profits from the business.210

Where many taxpaying shareholders of S corporations would benefit from
changing their businesses into C corporations,211 the characterization of “careful
tax planning” as indicative of the type of fraud opening the door to avoidance
under the Strong Arm power appears to be, as Shaw described, a “misnomer.”212
To the contrary, many tax advisory and financial service providers indeed
advise S corporation owners to consult tax planning advisors.213 Therefore, the
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. holdings
are likely more consistent with Congress’s intended purposes of creating greater
flexibility for the owners of small business corporations. These create an unusual
limitation on the Strong Arm power for S corporation election rights as well as
promoting the reorganization of debtors, as discussed in the following section.
2. Congress Intended to Create Equitable Outcomes in Both the
Bankruptcy and Internal Revenue Codes
The principal agenda in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings is to

can effectively lower the rate to 29.6%, many passthrough taxpayers may be interested in possibly changing
their businesses into C corporations.”).
208
See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565 (“Congress intended the election of S
corporation status to limit the influence of tax considerations on choice of entity used to own a business.”);
Shaw, supra note 17, at 47. See generally 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361–62 (2019).
209
Shaw, supra note 17, at 40, n.aa.
210
Id. at 47.
211
See id.
212
Id.
213
See, e.g., Kathy Pickering, How the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Impacts U.S. Tax Returns, H&R BLOCK,
(Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/irs/tax-reform/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/) (“One taxpayer’s
situation will be different from the next. If you’re curious to find out how tax reform will affect you, get an
estimate from our tax return and tax reform calculator and make an appointment to visit with a tax professional.
He or she will help you navigate the new tax laws.”).
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successfully reorganize the debtor.214 That agenda is comprised of two
objectives: (i) to rehabilitate the debtor, and (ii) to minimize forfeitures of
creditors.215 While those objectives are often at odds with one another, the
Bankruptcy Code tends to balance competing interests by “entrust[ing]
bankruptcy courts with ‘broad, equitable powers to balance the interests of the
affected parties . . . .’”216 In enacting Subchapter S of the Tax Code, “Congress
intended the election of S corporation status to limit the influence of tax
considerations on choice of entity used to own a business.”217 A bankruptcy
expert, Ian Follansbee, clarified that “outside of bankruptcy, dominion and
control over [S-corporation status] belongs not to the corporate entity but to its
shareholders, who were Congress’s intended beneficiaries in allowing the entity
and its shareholders to utilize pass-through tax treatment.”218
The decisions on both sides of the area of judicial uncertainty discussed in
this Comment, whether or not termination of Tax Code § 1361 elections
constitute avoidable fraudulent transfers under the Strong Arm power, each
conflict with Congress’s intended Tax and Bankruptcy purposes in some
aspects.219 However, the consequence of forcing shareholders to shoulder the
pass-through capital gains taxes arising from asset liquidation sales in
bankruptcy, while the bankruptcy estate realizes the entirety of those very capital
gains free and clear of tax liability, has been consistently recognized as
especially severe.220 The question of which adversarial party, either the debtor
or the creditors of the bankruptcy estate, must shoulder the burden remains open
to dispute. Nonetheless, the implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act should
encourage future courts to adopt the holdings of the In re Majestic Star Casino,

214
Joshua M. Silverstein, Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the Debate
Over Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 15 (2006).
215
Id.
216
See id. (quoting Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389 (1993)).
217
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 565
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (“Congress intended the election of S corporation status to limit the influence of tax
considerations on choice of entity used to own a business.”).
218
Follansbee, supra note 8, at 79.
219
See, e.g., Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d
736, 755 n.17 (3d. Cir. 2013).
220
Id. at 757 (“The Trans-Lines West decision, despite its flaws, clearly recognized that unfairness: ‘The
Trustee’s successful challenge of the Debtor’s revocation of its Subchapter S status in the present case would
have dire tax consequences to the non-consenting shareholder. Upon the Trustee’s sale of the Debtor’s real
estate, the liability for any capital gain would be passed on to the shareholder. Conversely, in its present C
corporation status, the Debtor’s estate will be liable for the capital gains tax.”) (citing Trans-Lines West, Inc. v.
Lines (In re Trans-LinesWest, Inc.), 203 B.R. 653, 660 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996)).

DOUGHERTYPROOFS_4.30.20

330

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/3/2020 4:51 PM

[Vol. 36

LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. decisions, which will serve to
promote uniformity and clarity.221
Prior to the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the tax scholar Richard
Shaw highlighted the conflicts between the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In
re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. decisions and the underlying policies of both the Tax
Code.222 Shaw stated: “It is well-founded tax policy that the function of the
capital gains tax is to impose a tax burden on appreciation recognized on
disposition of the property by the owner.”223 Shaw also recognized the
problematic tax-related effects of In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re
Bakersfield Westar, Inc. particularly in the context of bankruptcy proceedings:
The inequity of treating an S corporation different from a C
corporation or an individual owner is evident in the Bankruptcy Code
itself. If the bankrupt entity is a C corporation, the tax obligation
arising from a sale is treated as a direct administrative expense of the
estate under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(a)(1)(B), and must be paid
from corporate properties before settling claims of creditors. Likewise,
if the debtor in bankruptcy is an individual, the tax burden from the
sale of the property is also an administrative expense that must be paid
out of the bankruptcy estate before satisfying the claims of creditors.224

The bankruptcy courts’ decisions in the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re
Bakersfield Westar, Inc. produce an inconsistency that Shaw describes as
“abus[ing] the economics of both the tax and the bankruptcy systems by taking
advantage of the S election to distort the economics of bankruptcy
proceedings.”225 Similarly, in Sery v. Federal Business Centers, Inc., the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, arrived at a similar
conclusion, determining that a “shareholder is bound forever by the decision to
elect Subchapter S status is a bridge too far and not something that can
reasonably be read into the Subchapter S IRS election forms.”226 The Sery court
noted that “considering the very limited market for minority shares of close
corporations, shareholders in closely held S corporations would effectively be
held hostage if the Court were to find that Subchapter S election contractually
bound a shareholder to preserve the tax favored status.”227 Therefore, the In re
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

See In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 569.
Shaw, supra note 17, at 46–47.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46–47.
Id. at 47.
Sery v. Fed. Bus. Ctrs, Inc., 616 F.Supp.2d 496, 505 (D.N.J. 2008).
Id. at 505 n.3.
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Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. outcomes may
be more consistent with Congress’s intent in the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes by
largely mitigating that inequity to the shareholders, in addition to allowing
creditors to recover.228
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act has raised additional questions regarding whether
S-status is actually “valuable,” making it a revocable property interest subject to
the fraudulent conveyance doctrine,229 since the corporate income tax rate for C
corporations, despite double-taxation, may ultimately be less than the individual
income tax rates on pass-through shareholders.230 While the In re Trans-Lines
West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. courts found financial value for
creditors sufficient to justify permitting liquidating trustees to “Strong Arm”
shareholders into shouldering an anomalous burden,231 much of the pass-through
tax value of the status has been called into question by the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act.232 Therefore, the most equitable result in future litigation may be to prevent
trustees from nullifying revoked S elections because the current tax landscape
undermines the value in an S election or S termination, a large component of the
In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. decisions.
Therefore, the potential reduction of uncertainty for shareholders of insolvent S
corporations across jurisdictions justifies the implementation of a uniform
exception to the Strong Arm power.
3. Creditors Benefit from a Windfall at the Expense of Inequalities to NonDebtor Shareholders; The Standing Question Prevents a Suggested
Solution
The creation of an exception to the Strong Arm power for S corporation
elections would resolve the prohibited windfall to creditors which would not
otherwise be available, but for the coincidence of an S corporation entering

228
See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736,
756–57 (3d. Cir. 2013); Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578
B.R. 552, 564 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
229
Cf. Tabor, supra note 28, at 654–55 (2001) (referencing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994,
C892 ALI-ABA 597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994) (noting that the S corporation tax attribute “gained popularity in 1986
when federal income tax rates on corporations were higher than for individuals”)).
230
Cf. id.
231
See Parker v. Saunders (In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.), 226 B.R. 227, 234 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) (“The
ability to not pay taxes has a value to the debtor-corporation in this case.”).
232
See id. (“The ability to not pay taxes has a value to the debtor-corporation in this case.”); cf. In re
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 565 (“The fact that something confers value to the estate does not
necessarily create a property right in it.”). But see supra notes 199, 200, and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy.233 In contrast with shareholders, who foot a potentially astronomical
capital gains tax liability, Galesi emphasized that:
The most glaringly obvious equitable reason for allowing termination
is that, if termination is avoided, the tax on the capital gain generated
by the sale of the corporation’s assets by the trustee for the benefit of
the creditors will not be paid out of that income. As a result, the
creditors are unjustly enriched . . . .234

Such an unjust enrichment is exactly the prohibited windfall the Butner Court
aimed to eliminate with uniform property of the estate definitions across state
and federal courts.235 The In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC Court, which did
create such an exception, noted that, “[i]n its haste to provide cash for creditors,
the Ninth Circuit BAP in Bakersfield [Westar] and the Tennessee Bankruptcy
Court in . . . Trans–Lines West . . . [were] simply creating a windfall for the
bankruptcy estate at the expense of third parties who are not in the bankruptcy
proceeding.”236
The In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc. opinion provides a useful illustration of
the inequality caused by holdings permitting trustees to avoid shareholder
termination of S elections under the Strong Arm provision. In In re Bakersfield
Westar, Inc., if the shareholders of Bakersfield Westar, Inc. had been permitted
to terminate its prior election to be taxed as an S corporation, creditors of the
bankruptcy estate would have been liable for the $400,000.00 of capital gain
liability arising from the liquidation of Bakersfield Westar, Inc.’s assets.237
However, because the Court held that the revocation therefore created value and
therefore was an avoidable property interest,238 permitting the trustee to “Strong
Arm” the company back into an S corporation with pass-through tax
characteristics, the trustee shifted the $400,000 capital gain liability to the
corporation’s two individual shareholders.239
Shaw recognized that the decisions in In re Trans-Lines West and In re
Bakersfield Westar, Inc. effectively “creat[ed] a windfall for the bankruptcy
estate at the expense of third parties who are not in the bankruptcy
233

See, e.g., In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 757–58.
Galesi, supra note 8, at 180.
235
See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
236
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 716 F.3d at 755 n.17 (citing Richard A. Shaw, Taxing Shareholders
on the Income of an S Corporation in Bankruptcy, 1 NO. 6 BUS. ENTITIES 40, 1999 WL 1419055, at *46 (1999)).
237
In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc., 226 B.R. at 234.
238
Id.
239
Id.
234
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proceeding.”240 Further, Shaw explained, the In re Trans-Lines West and
Bakersfield decisions also contravene bankruptcy principles:
Because the shareholders of an S corporation have elected to follow a
tax structure created by Congress for the purpose of applying a single
tax instead of a two-tier tax, the Ninth Circuit BAP in Bakersfield has
decided that the trustee can arbitrarily place the tax burden resulting
from the future sale of bankruptcy assets or future operation of the
debtor’s business on third parties (shareholders of the S corporation
who are not parties to the pending bankruptcy proceeding), without
their consent. This abuses the economics of both the tax and the
bankruptcy systems by taking advantage of the S election to distort the
economics of bankruptcy proceedings. It separates the tax burden on
the property from the ownership of the property.241

These arguments were eventually recognized by the Third Circuit in In re
Majestic Star Casino, LLC, which cited Shaw, Galesi and Pope, 242 and
ultimately held that shareholders should have the ability to convert S
corporations to C corporations by exercising Tax Code § 1362(d)(1)(B)
termination rights without fearing that a bankruptcy trustee will impose an
inequitable tax burden in bankruptcy.243 Therefore, creation of an exception
preventing liquidating trustees from strong-arming owners into retaining S
corporation tax treatment in bankruptcy would prevent a prohibited windfall by
the mere coincidence of being a creditor of an S corporation, as opposed to a
creditor of some other entity like a C corporation, LLC, or LLP.
Underlying the creation of a prohibited windfall for creditors is a substantial
standing problem in preventing termination. The standing issue concerns the
distinction between the insolvent S corporation, an entity, and its shareholders,
who are individuals.244 Tax Code § 1362(a)(2) states that “[a]n election under
this subsection shall be valid only if all persons who are shareholders in such
corporation on the day on which such election is made consent to such
election.”245 The court in In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. noted that “the plain
language of the statute makes abundantly clear that the shareholders elect S

240

Shaw, supra note 17, at 46.
Shaw, supra note 17, at 47.
242
See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736,
755 fn.17 (3d. Cir. 2013).
243
See id. at 756.
244
See Follansbee, supra note 8, at 79.
245
26 U.S.C. § 1362(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added); see also Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States
(In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 566 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017).
241
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corporation status—not the corporate entity—and that any interest in electing S
corporation status belongs to the shareholders.”246 Shaw noted “more
inappropriate implications” concerning opinions permitting avoidance by
liquidating trustees:
If a trustee is in a position to treat the right to revoke the S election as
property of the estate, which the trustee can control without the consent
of the shareholders, then it is only a minor step for a trustee to assert
that this property right includes authority for the trustee to make an
affirmative election for a small business corporation to become an S
corporation under Subchapter S without the consent of the
shareholders. Technically, under Section 1362, an S election can be
made only by the corporation with the unanimous consent of all the
shareholders. Therefore, the trustee would need authority to take
affirmative action to make the election, in lieu of merely preventing
the shareholders from revoking the S status in derogation of the
corporate status quo.247

That conclusion is bolstered by the fact that usage limitations on QBI Deductions
are likely to drive shareholders to terminate S elections to avoid personally
incurring corporate income taxes (at personal rates).248 In the event that the
entity might later become insolvent within two years of doing so, failure to create
an exception to the Strong Arm power would permit liquidating trustees to force
shareholders into shouldering capital gain taxes from an asset liquidation.
However, the purpose of termination, in most instances, should properly be
attributed to efforts made in order to take advantage of a federal tax incentives
made available by the implementation of the TCJA. Moreover, since the
availability of the QBI Deduction for pass-through entities will expire in 2025
pursuant to the terms of § 199A(2)(i),249 here, too, the liquidating trustee could
foreseeably avoid terminations of S elections, perpetuating the existence of
unnecessary windfalls in the absence of an exception to the Strong Arm
power.250 Therefore, in consideration of the TCJA’s creation of new incentives
for owners of small business corporations to terminate Subchapter S elections,
decisions which create an exception to the § 548 Strong Arm power for S
246

In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 567.
Shaw, supra note 17, at 64 (emphasis added).
248
See Welker, supra note 3; Kolk, supra note 188.
249
26 U.S.C. § 199A(2)(i) (2018).
250
See Tabor, supra note 28, at 654 (“gained popularity in 1986 when federal income tax rates on
corporations were higher than for individuals”) (referencing Richard A. Shaw, S Corporations in 1994, C892
ALI-ABA 597, 611 (Mar. 3, 1994)); cf. Kolk, supra note 188 (“Considering that the top individual tax rate was
dropped only to 37% (from 39.6%), even with the addition of a 20% deduction for qualified business income
(QBI) that can effectively lower the rate to 29.6%, many passthrough taxpayers may be interested in possibly
changing their businesses into C corporations”).
247

DOUGHERTYPROOFS_4.30.20

2020]

5/3/2020 4:51 PM

VOLATILE WINDFALLS

335

elections and terminations appear much more likely to effectively and equitably
prevent prohibited windfalls in consideration of the terms of the TCJA.
4. Tax Code § 1362 S Corporation Elections: Analogy to Bankruptcy Code
§ 541 ERISA Property of the Estate Exception
Unlike the In re Trans-Lines West, Inc. and In re Bakersfield Westar, Inc.
decisions, which analogized S-elections to NOL’s, S corporation elections might
be more analogous to ERISA pension plans, an enumerated § 541 exception. For
example, in Patterson v. Shumate, the Supreme Court recognized an exception
to the general rule that interests of the debtor become estate property.251 The
Court held that: “a restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforceable
in a case under [this title].”252 Furthermore, the Court ruled that ERISA pension
plans were not revocable by the trustee.253 The Court reasoned that “Section
206(d)(1) of ERISA, which states that ‘[e]ach pension plan shall provide that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated,’ 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(1), clearly imposes a ‘restriction on the transfer’ of a debtor’s
‘beneficial interest’ in the trust.”254 Therefore, the Court held that, in bankruptcy,
ERISA’s anti-alienation requirement created an exception to the trustee’s
avoidance power.255
While the Court noted that, under ERISA, pension plans might contain
enforceable provisions that specifically restrict the transfer of a financial
interest, S corporation elections are also somewhat limited in their transferability
by the language of IRC Section 1362.256 The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.
court noted that:
Shareholders have the overwhelming ability to control the tax status
of their corporation. Election of S corporation status may be achieved
by one method—unanimous shareholder consent. The federal tax
statute governing the election of S corporation status states that “[a]n
election under this subsection shall be valid only if all persons who
are shareholders in such corporation on the day on which such
election is made consent to such election.” . . . The plain language of

251
252
253
254
255
256

Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 756 (1992).
Id. at 757; 11 U.S.C. 541(c)(1)–(2) (2019).
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 759–60.
Id. at 759.
See id. at 759–60.
See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1362 (2018).
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the statute makes abundantly clear that the shareholders elect S
corporation status—not the corporate entity—and that any interest in
electing S corporation status belongs to the shareholders.257

Therefore, the In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court’s holding is consistent
with Patterson’s analysis in the sense that Subchapter S limits the transferability
of that tax-attribute with respect to bankruptcy trustees.258
More importantly, the Patterson court noted a number of policy
considerations, which may be similar to S elections.259 First, the Court noted that
its “decision . . . ensures that the treatment of pension benefits will not vary
based on the beneficiary’s bankruptcy status.”260 The Court noted that it was
important to maintain that ERISA pension plans were non-transferrable in
bankruptcy proceedings, “minimiz[ing] the possibility that creditors will engage
in strategic manipulation of the bankruptcy laws in order to gain access to
otherwise inaccessible funds.”261 Outside of bankruptcy, the imposition of
capital gains taxes to indirectly satisfy creditor claims would otherwise be
inaccessible to creditors and the bankruptcy estate.262 The Supreme Court’s
creation of an exception in Patterson suggests the S elections might deserve
similar treatment.
The In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC-Star and In re Health Diagnostic Lab.,
Inc. holdings, much like the Supreme Court’s holding in Patterson, protect, in
bankruptcy proceedings, the property interests and transfer restrictions created
under other federal laws. While in the case of ERISA, each plan must state that
the pension plans are not assignable,263 there is no such requirement in the Tax
Code.264 The In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re Health Diagnostic Lab.,
Inc. decisions are consistent in their treatment of other federal laws regardless
of bankruptcy since any interest in electing S corporation status belongs to the

257
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.), 578 B.R. 552, 566
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017) (emphasis in original) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1362(a)(2)).
258
See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
259
See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764.
260
Id. (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
261
Id.
262
Cf. id. (citing Seiden, Chapter 7 Cases: Do ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code Conflict as to Whether a
Debtor’s Interest in or Rights Under a Qualified Plan Can be Used to Pay Claims?, 61 AM. BANKR. L. J. 301,
317 (1987) (noting inconsistency if “a creditor could not reach a debtor-participant’s plan right or interest in a
garnishment or other collection action outside of a bankruptcy case but indirectly could reach the plan right or
interest by filing a petition . . . to place the debtor in bankruptcy involuntarily”)).
263
See supra notes 254, 255, and accompanying text.
264
Galesi, supra note 8, at 157.
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shareholders.265 For instance, the In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court
remarked: “The mere filing of the tax form does not confer control over the S
corporation status. It is unrealistic to suggest that a corporation could ever revolt
against its shareholders by refusing to file the revocation form.”266 As a result,
bankruptcy courts should allow an exception for S corporation termination
rights, which are arguably made inalienable by the Tax Code.
Protecting Subchapter S election and termination rights prevents the risk of
strategic manipulation, which the Patterson Court also sought to prevent when
it created a Strong Arm power exception for ERISA pension plans.267 Shaw
noted that the “purpose of the revocation of an S election is not to defraud
creditors but simply to ensure that the tax obligation arising from the sale is tied
to the proceeds from the sale[,]” consistent with tax principles.268 Therefore,
allowing shareholders to revoke an S election might already sufficiently mitigate
exposure to risk of strategic manipulation for access to funds otherwise
inaccessible, in a manner consistent with Patterson. In light of the foreseeably
increased quantity of Subchapter S terminations, the creation of a Bankruptcy
Code § 541 property of the estate exception, preventing trustees from asserting
§ 548 avoidance powers on terminated S corporations, may warrant an exception
to the fraudulent conveyance doctrine in a manner similar to ERISA pension
plans.
5. The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. Court Correctly Applied
Judicially Created Essential Property Rights Test in Absence of
Intervening Code Guidance
The In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court correctly applied the Supreme
Court’s Essential Property Rights Test, which “recognize[s] that certain interests
constitute ‘property’ for federal tax purposes . . . .”269 The In re Health
Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court recognized that: “The Fourth Circuit in Virginia
Historic Tax Credit Fund utilized the analysis [from the Supreme Court case]
United States v. Craft to determine whether the interest at issue classified as
265
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. United States (In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.) 578 B.R. 552, 566
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2017); and Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC).,
716 F.3d 736 (3d Cir. 2013).
266
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R at 567.
267
See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 764.
268
See Shaw, supra note 17, at 47.
269
In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563 (citing Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP
v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 639 F.3d 129, 141 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 277, 283
(2002)).
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‘property’ for section 707 of the Tax Code.”270 The In re Health Diagnostic Lab.,
Inc. court also noted a number of instances where the Tax Code Essential
Property Rights Test was applicable to Bankruptcy Code issues.271 In addition
to the Essential Property Rights Test’s applicability in the Fourth Circuit, the In
re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court referenced the applicability of the Craft
analysis to tax issues in bankruptcy across a number of jurisdictions and courts,
including the Ninth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit, and the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Maryland.272 Therefore, the In re Health Diagnostic
Lab., Inc. court’s application of the Essential Property Rights Test between two
bodies of federal law—the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes—may promote clarity in
an area of federal interest. As the In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. court noted,
application of the Essential Property Rights Test to the Bankruptcy Code is, at
minimum, “bolstered by the fact that the courts that have extensively analyzed
this issue have all concluded that federal law controls.”273 As a result, “there is
no risk of inconsistent treatment of this choice of law issue.”274
Since a range of federal courts have successfully applied the Essential
Property Rights Test across circuits in considering what constitutes a § 522
Exemption in the Bankruptcy Code, an area which federal law controls, there
lies a strong argument for the uniform application of the Essential Property
Rights Test for § 541 property of the estate exceptions, which define the scope
of the trustee’s Strong Arm power.275 Since each of the courts addressing the
issue have agreed that federal law should apply in determining whether S
270

In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563 n.19 (emphasis added).
See id. (citing Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 639 F.3d
129, 141 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 277, 283 (2002)).
272
See id. (referencing Greene v. Savage (In re Greene), 583 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the
Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1)); Wallace v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 513 F.3d 212, 223–24 (5th Cir. 2008)
(applying the Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1)); In re Conrad, 544 B.R. 568, 571–73 (Bankr. Md. 2016)
(applying the Craft analysis to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B)); United States v. Towne, 406 F. Supp. 2d 928, 935
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (applying the Craft analysis to 26 U.S.C. § 6321).
271

The Fourth Circuit in Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund utilized the analysis from United States
v. Craft to determine whether the interest at issue classified as “property” for section 707 of the
Tax Code. 639 F.3d at 140–41. While Virginia Historic Tax Credit Fund concerned section 707 of
the Tax Code, the Court finds the analysis and balancing test applicable to this case. Courts have
repeatedly applied the Craft analysis to several different federal statutes.
While none of the aforementioned cases concerned the applicability of United States. v. Craft, 535 U.S. 277
(2002) to the breadth of “Property of the estate” under 11 U.S.C. § 541 or 11 U.S.C. 548, they do concern
bankruptcy “exemptions” under 11 U.S.C. § 522. In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc., 578 B.R. at 563 n.19.
273
Id. at 563.
274
Id.
275
See id.
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elections are property moving forward,276 the In re Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc.
court’s application of the Essential Property Rights Test offers clarity within an
uncertain area of federal interest which may soon see more attention, and
supports a conclusion that creating an exception to the Bankruptcy Code’s
Strong Arm power for S corporation’s may be necessary. The implementation
of the Fourth Circuit Essential Property Rights Test indeed results in an
exception to the Strong Arm Power, serving to prevent uncertainty, forum
shopping, and prohibited windfalls by producing a uniform outcome.
CONCLUSION
This Comment suggests that the In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC and In re
Health Diagnostic Lab., Inc. decisions, which hold that Tax Code §§ 1361–62
elections and terminations fall outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Code § 548
Strong Arm Power, are likely to more effectively further Tax and Bankruptcy
Code policies than the alternative solution, which imposes a disproportionately
large tax liability on shareholders of S corporations.277 In addition to addressing
a nuanced statutory interpretation problem within the split discussed in this
Comment, whether termination of Tax Code § 1361 elections constitute
avoidable fraudulent transfers under the Strong Arm power, these decisions are
consistent with the essential policy goals of both federal codes.
First, preventing trustees from revoking S terminations as fraudulent
conveyances is consistent with Congress’s intent concerning Subchapter S of the
Tax Code as well as the Strong Arm power of the Bankruptcy Code. Second,
“careful tax planning” is not penalized in other areas of the Bankruptcy Code
and should not be penalized in light of recent tax changes of particular
consequence to Subchapter S corporations. Third, an exception to the Strong
Arm provision allowing shareholders to terminate S elections prevents a
windfall to creditors merely by the happenstance of an S corporation’s
bankruptcy. Fourth, Congress’s intent in creating the S corporation, as well as
the terms of §§ 1361–62 of the Tax Code, suggest that S corporations are similar
enough to ERISA retirement plans, an enumerated exception to the Strong Arm
power, to warrant a similar exception for S corporation election and termination
rights. Fifth, the application of the Essential Property Rights Test to tax-specific
276
Id. (“This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the courts that have extensively analyzed this issue
have all concluded that federal law controls. Thus there is no risk of inconsistent treatment on this choice of law
issue.”).
277
See Majestic Star Casino, LLC v. Barden Dev., Inc. (In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC), 716 F.3d 736
(3d Cir. 2013) (deciding that S corporation status is not revocable by the Liquidating Trustee in cont*ext of
deciding that Q subs are not revocable).
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disputes in bankruptcy presents a useful analytical tool for courts moving
forward, serving to prevent uncertainty, forum shopping, and prohibited creditor
windfalls. Therefore, courts outside of the Fourth Circuit would do well to adopt
the Essential Property Rights Test. Moreover, at the intersection of the Tax and
Bankruptcy Codes, there lies a strong argument for creating an exception to the
fraudulent conveyance doctrine for S corporations.
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